

Message Text

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PAGE 01 USBERL 00619 01 OF 02 161743Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06
IO-13 ACDA-12 EB-08 DOE-11 SOE-02 COME-00 TRSE-00
/107 W

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R 161545Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6451
AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USBERLIN 0619

E O 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV WB
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH BERLIN'S GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE

SUMMARY: BERLIN'S GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE, IN MARCH 15 CONVERSATION WITH VISITING EUR/CE OFFICER CHESTER AND IN TELEVISION INTERVIEW MAR 13, ASSESSED SOVIET BERLIN POLICY TO BE ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AT THIS TIME. HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT PROPER WESTERN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PRESSURES ON BERLIN SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE FULL USE OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT, WHILE EXERCISING CAREFUL POLITICAL JUDGEMENT IN THE DETERMINING WHEN AND HOW WEST BERLIN TIES WITH THE FRG SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. IN CONVERSATION WITH CHESTER, STOBBE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SOVIET WEST BERLIN POLICY WAS ESSENTIALLY A FUNCTION OF THEIR CONCERN OVER INTERNAL GDR DEVELOPMENTS. THEY WANT TO SEE A QUIET WEST BERLIN WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE NORMAL "DEMOCRATIC RADIATION" FROM WEST BERLIN. STOBBE ALSO FELT THAT FRG-GDR RELATIONS WERE IN A

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PAGE 02 USBERL 00619 01 OF 02 161743Z

PERIOD OF STAGNATION, ALTHOUGH THOSE ITEMS NOW IN THE PIPELINE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE COMPLETED. END SUMMARY.

1. GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE RECEIVED EUR/CE OFFICER CHESTER MARCH 15 (ACCOMPANIED BY MISOFFS SEMLER AND BECKER). IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON DIFFERENT SUBJECTS, STOBBE DESCRIBED IN UNUSUALLY CLEAR TERMS HIS VIEWS ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET POLICY

TOWARD WEST BERLIN. HE SAID THAT THE MAIN SOVIET CONCERN WAS UNDOUBTEDLY PROBLEMS IN THE GDR. ABRASIMOV, WHO STOBBE NOTED CONSIDERS HIMSELF TO BE ONE OF THE TOP HUNDRED SOVIET POLITICIANS, HAD THE JOB OF INSURING THAT THE GDR REMAINED A HEALTHY AND COOPERATIVE PARTNER OF THE USSR. BASICALLY, THE HEALTH OF THE USSR'S EMPIRE IN EASTERN EUROPE DEPENDS ON ITS GRASP OVER THE MIDDLE GERMAN TERRAIN. WEST BERLIN IS FOR THE SOVIETS A TOTALLY SECONDARY MATTER EXCEPT WHEN ITS LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES IMPINGE UPON GDR STABILITY. COMMENTING ON HIS FEBRUARY 24 DINNER WITH ABRASIMOV, STOBBE SAID ABRASIMOV CLEARLY WAS NOT INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING BONN-BERLIN TIES. RATHER, ABRASIMOV WAS CALLING FOR A WEST BERLIN SITUATION WHICH WOULD NOT AFFECT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC. FOR EXAMPLE, A KOHL VISIT TO EAST BERLIN, WHEN HE MIGHT BE ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED ON THE ALEXANDERPLATZ IN CONNECTION WITH A WEST BERLIN VISIT, WAS PRECISELY WHAT THE GDR DID NOT WANT. STOBBE ALSO RECOUNTED THAT DURING THE RECENT VISIT TO DRESDEN OF WEST BERLIN'S OUTSTANDING THEATER "SCHAUBUEHNE", THE ACTORS HAD BEEN TREATED TO THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR OF SOLID EMOTIONAL APPLAUSE. THIS IS THE KIND OF EAST GERMAN REACTION THAT WORRIES ABRASIMOV. (STOBBE THEN ADDED HE HOPED TO GO TO THE GDR POSSIBLY WITH HERTHA BSC, WEST BERLIN'S FIRST DIVISION SOCCER TEAM, OR WITH THE BERLIN PHILHARMONIC IN MAY).

2. LOOKING AT THE GERMAN SITUATION IN MORE GENERAL TERMS,
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PAGE 03 USBERL 00619 01 OF 02 161743Z

STOBBE FELT THAT THE CURRENT INTERREGNUM IN THE USSR, WHERE EVERYBODY IS WAITING TO SEE WHAT WILL HAPPEN, WAS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THERE IS STAGNATION IN FRG-GDR RELATIONS WHICH COULD WELL LAST A GOOD WHILE. STOBBE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THOSE ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS AUTOBAHN CONSTRUCTION TO HAMBURG WHICH WERE "IN THE PIPELINE" WOULD BE COMPLETED. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT SO SURE THAT THE NEXT FEW YEARS WOULD SEE MAJOR NEW PROGRESS. THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM A PERSONAL PROBLEM, HE ADDED. FOR A WHILE, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO POINT TO THE AUTOBAHN AS A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT. EVENTUALLY, HE WOULD SUFFER IF HE WERE UNABLE TO POINT TO ADDITIONAL PROGRESS. LACK OF PROGRESS WOULD FORCE HIM TO TAKE A MORE POLEMICAL, POLITICAL APPROACH IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO WEST BERLIN ENERGY SUPPLY, A HIGH-PRIORITY SUBJECT, STOBBE EXPRESSED CERTAINTY THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE PURCHASE OF SOME ELECTRICITY FROM THE GDR ON A TRIANGULAR BASIS WITH THE FRG. HE SAID HE HAD HEARD ABOUT SOME CIRCLES IN THE GDR WHO ARGUED WITHIN GDR COUNCILS FOR A

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PAGE 01 USBERL 00619 02 OF 02 161746Z
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USBERLIN 0619

VERY FORTHCOMING TRADING APPROACH TO WEST BERLIN IN THE
HOPE THE RESULT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE SOME DEGREE OF
DEPENDENCE ON THE GDR. IN GENERAL, HE DID NOT SEE MUCH
PROSPECT THAT THE GDR WOULD HELP WEST BERLIN BECOME
AN EAST-WEST TRADE CENTER.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE IDEA OF A STOBBE TRIP TO MOSCOW,
STOBBE SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT THINK IT WOULD TAKE
PLACE, ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS
WOULD LIKE HIM TO COME. WHILE THE FRG AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW
NEED NOT BE ON THE SCENE ALL THE TIME ("THAT WOULD BE TOO
PRIMITIVE"), A DECEND ROLE WOULD HAVE TO BE BUILD IN FOR HIM
DURING THE STOBBE VISIT. FALIN HAD PROMISED HIM TO SOUND
OUT MOSCOW ON THIS POINT. STOBBE THOUGHT IT SOMEWHAT
PROMISING THAT ABRASIMOV HAD NOT RAISED THE VISIT, WHICH
SEEMED TO LIE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF FALIN. SOVIET
COORDINATION WAS BETTER THAN HE HAD EXPECTED.

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PAGE 02 USBERL 00619 02 OF 02 161746Z

5. SOME OF THE ABOVE THEMES WERE CONTAINED IN A MARCH 13 SFB

TELEVISION PROGRAM KONTRASTE DURING WHICH STOBBE AGAIN CHARACTERIZED MOSCOW'S PRESENT POLICIES TOWARDS BERLIN AS "FUNDAMENTALLY CONSERVATIVE" AND "DEFENSIVE IN THEIR ESSENTIALS." STOBBE TOLD HIM AUDIENCE THAT SOVIET POLICIES IN THIS AREA ARE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH MAINTAINING THE STABILITY OF THE GDR AND REINFORCING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET BLOC. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ATTACKING OR UNDERCUTTING WEST BERLIN, BUT RATHER THEIR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO CONTAIN WEST BERLIN'S INFLUENCE ON THE UNSTABLE EAST GERMAN SOCIETY AROUND IT.

6. ON THE QA, STOBBE CONSIDERED IT TO BE IN BERLIN'S BEST INTERESTS TO PURSUE A POLICY OF STRENGTHENED BONDS WHICH LINKED THE CITY TO THE FRG; IN OTHER WORDS, TO EXHAUST THE POSSIBILITIES PROVIDED BY THE QA, PROVIDED IT MADE SENSE TO DO SO. IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT ONE NOT GO A "SINGLE MILLIMETER" BEYOND THAT WHICH IS PERMISSIBLE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE WEST SHOULD NOT DENY ITSELF UNNECESSARILY USE OF THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH THE QA OFFERS. THE GOAL OF WESTERN POLICY IN BERLIN SHOULD BE TO STEER A STABLE "MIDDLE COURSE".

7. STOBBE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME UNHAPPINESS WITH FRG MANAGEMENT OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. LEAVING WISCHNEWSKI TO COORDINATE THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF GERMAN POLICY WAS A MISTAKE; ONE MONTH WISCHNEWSKI HANDLES MOGADISCIO, THEN HE TAKES ON A LABOR DISPUTE, AND IN BETWEEN VISITS EAST BERLIN. (ON WISCHNEWSKI'S GDR VISIT, STOBBE THOUGHT THAT AFTER ALL THE CRITICISM, ONE POSITIVE RESULT HAD OCCURRED IN THAT THE AUTOBAHN TRAFFIC WAS RUNNING MORE SMOOTHLY.) STOBBE FELT THAT THE FRG SHOULD BE MAKING A CONSTANT FLOW OF PROPOSALS TO THE GDR, ACTING AS THE DYNAMIC PARTNER IN THE RELATIONSHIP, AND FORCING THE SED POLITBURO TO CONSIDER CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 USBERL 00619 02 OF 02 161746Z

EACH PROPOSAL ON ITS MERITS.

8. COMMENT: WE FIND THESE VIEWS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL INASMUCH AS THE WEST BERLIN PRESS CONTINUES IN THE BEST ETHNOCENTRIC TRADITION TO REGARD EVERY SOVIET ACTION IN WEST BERLIN AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CITY ITSELF. WE SUSPECT THAT STOBBE MAY HAVE A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF SOVIET PRIORITIES IN FOREIGN POLICY AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT PLEASED AT THE PROSPECT THAT A SOVIET INTERREGNUM WOULD DAMPEN EAST-WEST PROGRESS IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME TO COME, HE DID SAY THAT WEST BERLIN COULD SURVIVE SUCH A COOLING-OFF PERIOD, AND THAT IT HAD PERHAPS ONE ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. THIS WAS THAT THE DYNAMISM OF THE WEST WOULD BE LESS IN EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE LESS DESTABILIZING IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING SUCH A PERIOD OF SLOW MOTION. STOBBE HAD BEEN CONCERNED THAT DISSIDENT ELEMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN POLAND BUT PERHAPS IN THE

GDR, WERE HEADING TOWARD A CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD ONLY
END IN ANOTHER PERIOD OF TOTAL REPRESSION. A FEW YEARS OF
RELATIVE INACTIVITY WOULD DAMPEN THIS KIND OF FERMENT
WHICH COULD TOO EASILY END IN CATASTROPHE. THIS VIEW OF THE
UNDESIRABILITY OF DESTABILIZING DISSENT IN THE GDR IS WIDELY
TYPICAL OF THE SPD.GEORGE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MAYOR, SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, MANAGEMENT, BERLIN QUADRIpartite MATTERS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978USBERL00619
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780117-0895
Format: TEL
From: USBERLIN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780357/aaaabwqi.tel
Line Count: 230
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: daa917c5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3298867
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH BERLIN'S GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE SUMMARY: BERLIN'S GOVERNING MAYOR STOBBE, IN MARCH 15
CONVER- SATION WITH VISITING EUR/CE OFFICER CHESTER AND IN
TAGS: PGOV, WB, UR, (STOBBE, DIETRICH)
To: STATE BONN
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/daa917c5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014